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Abstract 
 
The efficiency of investment affects the future development of the enterprises. The 
relevant literature on the corporate investment shows that the information asymmetry 
and the conflict of agency between the executives and the shareholders of the 
enterprises have a significant influence on the investment decision-makings. This 
study uses data of Chinese SOEs to analyze the factors affecting the efficiency of 
capital allocation of these Chinese SOEs from the perspective of free cash flow, 
ownership structure, agency costs, financing constraints and government intervention. 
The results of this study show that the phenomenon of over-investment is relatively 
obvious among the Chinese state-controlled listed enterprises. The results also show 
that substantial free cash flow, relatively high ownership concentration and 
government intervention are the major factors that lead to the over-investment in these 
Chinese state-owned listed companies. At the meantime, the financing constraints 
play a positive role in restraining the over-investment of Chinese SOEs, but their 
effect is quite weak. Moreover, the distortions of the senior executives’ value goals 
lead to the failure of executive compensation mechanism and the construction of a 
proper governance system needs to begin with the property rights relations.  
 
Keywords:  Over-investment; Chinese SOEs; Investment efficiency 
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1. Introduction 
The development of economy has always faced the problem of resource constraints. 
Therefore, the goal pursued by a larger number of academics is to optimize the 
allocation of resources under the conditions of limited resources. As a key part of the 
allocation of the capital resources, investment directly affect the cash flow of a 
company and become the driving force of the daily operation, subsequent growth and 
further development of the company. Also, the efficiency of corporate investment is 
the basis of the corporate financing. In the system of measuring the value of an 
enterprise, the investment efficiency is regarded as an important indicator for the 
performance evaluation of the corresponding enterprises. The efficiency of investment 
is a fundamental issue that concerns whether a company can maintain its healthy 
development in the long run. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that there is no friction in the capital market, that is to say, 
there doesn’t exist transaction costs, taxes, bankruptcy costs and therefore everyone 
can obtain same market information. However, in the real world, enterprises often 
engage in the inefficient investment due to the prevalence of problems such as 
information asymmetry, principal-agent problems existing inside the company and the 
financing constraints. As a matter of fact, over-investment is a type of investment that 
is not conducive to the development of the enterprises. It not only results in the waste 
of resources, but also damages the interests of shareholders of enterprises since the 
valuable funds are invested in the projects whose net present value is less than 0. 
Jensen (1986) provides the explanations for the over-investment from the perspective 
of free cash flow and agency theory. Myers and Majluf (1984) explain the 
over-investment from the perspective of information asymmetry. When enterprises 
have quite sufficient funds or there are relatively stable and sufficient cash flows, 
managers may usually increase and expand investment blindly so that they can obtain 
more resources and gain greater power. In this paper, I will mainly focus on the 
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discussions on the Chinese state-owned enterprises to examine the main factors that 
lead to over-investment. 
 
Since the open reform of China, the rapid development of Chinese economy has 
attracted great attention around the world. There is no doubt that investment is the 
main driver of China’s economic growth. However, the efficiency of investment is not 
ideal, especially for the issue of over-investment in Chinese state-owned enterprises, 
which has been criticized by many people. In terms of the corporate investment 
efficiency, countries with developed market economies have carried out a series of 
relatively more systematic and in-depth research. However, China is still in the 
transitional period of market economy. It is generally agreed that the Chinese capital 
market is still immature, the legal system is not yet perfect, and the degree of 
economic freedom is still not high. As a result, the factors affecting the corporate 
investment efficiency are more complicated, especially for the Chinese state-owned 
enterprises. In China, the state-owned enterprises are the pillar of the Chinese national 
economy and they are dominant in the key sectors and important areas of the national 
economy. These Chinese SOEs cover key areas of the national economy such as 
finance, aviation, railway, marine, oil and natural gas, wood, tobacco, tap water, 
electronic steam, coal and ferrous metal smelting and they occupy more than 70 
percent of the total market share. Under the special political and economic 
background of China, these Chinese SOEs have superior financing conditions and it’s 
easier for them to get access to the capital, since they have more financing channels 
such as equity refinancing which includes share allotments and secondary public 
offering and bank loans. Moreover, the governance structure of Chinese state-owned 
listed enterprises is quite special. As a matter of fact, a minority of shareholders 
monopolize the ownership of the company. As a result, the general meetings of 
shareholders which represent the rights and interests of the company’s shareholders 
may fail to exercise their original functions properly and eventually they become 
useless. At the same time, the Chinese government tries to ensure their control on 
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these state-owned enterprises through the appointment of senior management, 
especially appointing those who have working experience in the government sectors 
(Chen, Sun, Tang & Wu, 2011). With this in mind, the governments can perform their 
intervention in these Chinese SOEs to affect the decision-makings of the enterprises 
and they try to accomplish their political and social goals by internalizing a series of 
non-efficient goals into corporate investment objectives (Chen, Sun, Tang & Wu, 
2011). According to Dollar and Wei (2007), Chinese state-owned enterprises have 
been associated with relatively low economic efficiency and relatively high 
asset-to-liability ratio for a long time, due to the multiple tasks undertaken by these 
companies such as providing employment, regulating and controlling the economy 
and ensuring the social stability. In the practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises, 
accompanied with high profits, many of these companies have engaged in the 
over-investment. Consequently, this phenomenon has been criticized by a great 
number of people.  
 
This paper analyzes the factors affecting the efficiency of capital allocation of the 
Chinese state-owned enterprises from the perspective of free cash flow, ownership 
structure, agency costs, financing constraints and government intervention based on 
the sample of the state-owned companies in China from 2007 to 2016, which totals to 
10 years. The main purpose of this paper is to use empirically test to examine the 
determinants of the over-investment of Chinese state-owned listed enterprises. The 
major findings of this paper are shown as follows: First of all, the problem of 
over-investment in the Chinese state-owned enterprises is quite common. Second, 
substantial free cash flow, relatively high ownership concentration and government 
intervention are the main factors that lead to the over-investment in China's 
state-controlled listed companies. Meanwhile, the political relationship between 
executives of enterprises affects the corporate decision-making processes, thus 
resulting in the over-investment of the company. Third, the financing constraints play 
a positive role in restraining the over-investment of Chinese SOEs, but their effect is 
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quite weak. The level of debt does not have a constraint effect on the contingent 
governance of these Chinese state-owned enterprises. Fourth, in China, these top 
executives of state-controlled listed companies are merely agents of the government. 
Due to the lack of reasonable property rights relations, it can easily lead to the 
distortions in these top managers’ value target. At the same time, the imperfect 
corresponding assessment and supervision mechanisms make them prone to pursue 
the expansion of the company's scale and invest state-owned assets in projects with 
negative net present values, which eventually lead to the over-investment in the 
company. In fact, the system of independent directors and the executive compensation 
have not been well established and improved in China. These two kinds of 
mechanisms have not actually played their due role in the practice. 
 
This paper makes contributions to the literature in the following ways. First, the 
evidence provided by this paper enriches the existing literature on corporate 
investment efficiency. The previous research on the over-investment mainly focuses 
on the agency conflict which is caused by the information asymmetry. This paper 
shows that the political connections lead to the over-investment of state-owned 
enterprises. It indicates that political force also affects the process of corporate 
investment directly. Second, while studying the influencing factors of over-investment 
in Chinese state-owned listed enterprises, this paper does not only fully consider the 
complex relationship between free cash flow and financing constraints, but also takes 
into account the related mechanisms of ownership structure and corporate governance, 
especially in the aspect of the role played by the checks and balances ownership and 
the independent directors. The unique failure of check-and-balance as well as 
independent directors in the Chinese SOEs provides important implications for 
finding out the measures to curb the over-investment decision-makings of 
management.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
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literatures which can provide the theoretical basis for the research on the 
over-investment of Chinese state-owned listed enterprises and presents relevant 
research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and data sources of this 
research and provides detailed information on the model design and the definitions of 
variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and provides relevant analysis and 
discussions based on the research findings. Section 5 presents the overall conclusion 
of this paper and provides the corresponding recommendations for Chinese 
government.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
The issue of investment efficiency has always been a hot topic in the field of 
academic research. In an imperfect capital market, the theories including 
principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, free cash flow hypothesis and 
financing constraint theory all provide theoretical support for the over-investment of 
the company. In order to further empirically examine the effects of free cash flow, 
ownership structure, agency cost, financing constraints and government intervention 
on the over-investment in Chinese state-owned listed enterprises, the hypotheses of 
this paper are put forward.  
2.1 Principal-agent problem and over-investment 
According to Adolf and Means (1932), based on the questioning of the relevant 
traditional theory of shareholders’ rights and equity, the principal-agent theory was 
put forward. That is to say, the separation of the ownership and control is quite 
common in modern enterprises and it also creates the principal-agent relationship 
between these shareholders and managers of the company (Adolf and Means, 1932). 
Many scholars have studied the principal-agent theory through the design of empirical 
models, which can be summarized as the following three types: The first type is 
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represented by state space formulation, where the contract is designed through 
methods include utility functions, uncertain information distribution and so on, 
therefore the principal-agent relationship is modeled (e.g., Wilson, 1968; Spence & 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). The second type is regarded as the standardized 
method for solving the principal-agent problem, which is called parameterized 
distribution formulation, was first proposed by Mirrlees (1976) and Hölmstrom 
(1979). The third type is called general distribution formulation, although this model 
is relatively simple, it still has defect that it cannot properly explain the actions of 
agents and it does not provide the explanations for the incurred related costs.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) believed that the arrangement of the ownership structure 
is a kind of agency costs, under the principal-agent theory, the principal-agent 
relationship between managers and shareholders is formed by signing the contract. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), when the objectives of the managers differ 
from the objectives of the shareholders, managers are more likely to take actions 
based on the considerations for their own benefits, rather than try to realize the 
maximization of the owners’ rights and equity. Therefore, business owners do not 
have a good understanding of whether managers are working hard or not due to the 
information asymmetry. The firm value can be lower when the ownership and control 
rights are separated. Based on a series of strict assumptions, the corporate investment 
theories in the neoclassical framework propose the most important influencing factors 
in its perceived investment expenditures. These theories include the irrelevance theory 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the neoclassical investment theory of Jorgenson 
(1963) and Tobin’s q theory of Tobin (1969).  
 
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) find that when enterprises get 
windfalls, the managers of the company will not choose to give these windfalls back 
to the shareholders and will use them to invest in some poor projects. The separation 
of ownership and control rights will result in inconsistent goals between shareholders 
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and management of the company, the former aims to maximize their economic 
benefits, while the latter aims to maximize their control rights (Blanchard et al., 1994). 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) analyzed the two-tiered agency model of shareholders 
and managers and pointed out that due to the power struggles, rent-seeking behaviors, 
and agency problems of department managers, the efficiency of internal capital 
markets is low, which in turn seriously damages the corporate value. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) illustrated the first layer of principal-agent relationship through their 
empirical analysis and concluded that when managers can obtain private benefits, they 
are likely to have the motivation to engage in the over-investment.  
 
The company's agency costs can be measured by the executive compensation. Based 
on the arguments shown above, the first hypothesis is proposed.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The agency costs are negatively related to the over-investment in 
Chinese SOEs.  
2.2. Corporate governance and over-investment 
Alchian (1969) explored the efficiency of investment within the company and argued 
that when there is no cost for information disclosure and there is no incentive issue of 
external capital market, the company is in the position of information superiority. 
Stulz (1990) pointed out that the greatest advantage of diversification is to provide 
various channels for investment, since diversified operations can involve projects in 
different field and the company can use more projects with positive net present value 
of investment to effectively solve the problem of under-investment, which provides a 
channel for increasing the firm value. Narayanan (1988) stated that the key to 
improving the corporate investment efficiency lies in the implementation of incentive 
policies which combined the monetary compensation with the equity incentives. Since 
the payments of cash compensation to the managers of the company may cause the 
company to encounter the cash deficiency on the long-term investment projects; 
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however, if only the equity incentive approach is adopted by the company, it will 
easily lead to the over-investment of the company. Therefore, the payment of 
compensation has a direct impact on the investment behavior of corporate investors 
and good corporate governance has a significant suppressive effect on the 
overinvestment of the company.  
 
According to Nowak and McCabe (2003), the independent corporate directors with 
high professional skills usually have a strong sense of responsibility; therefore they 
can identify and suppress the over-investment behaviors of the managers in time. The 
research results show that companies with higher corporate social responsibility 
performance have higher investment efficiency (Samet and Jarboui, 2017). According 
to Samet and Jarboui (2017), it is in line with their expectations, socially responsible 
companies often featured by lower sensitivity between corporate investment and cash 
flows, lower constraints in capital and better access to financing and high 
management quality, which helps to ease the inefficient investment. Chen and Chen 
(2017) found that there exists a positive relationship between a more effective process 
of investment allocation and higher independence of the board of directors, ownership 
of outside directors and CEO's equity-based compensation. Richardson (2006) also 
argued that the corporate governance can inhibit the over-investment behaviors in 
enterprises and managers' shareholdings can reduce the agency costs and realize the 
decline in the phenomenon of companies’ over-investment. Li and Wang (2010) state 
that higher quality of financial report can alleviate the issue of over-investment in 
enterprises and improve the total corporate investment efficiency.  
Jung, Lee & Weber (2014) believed that the frictions of financing derived from the 
asymmetric information may cause the investment decision-makings to become 
unsatisfactory. The shareholder governance pattern is advocated by Adolf and Means 
(1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). At the same time, the stakeholder governance pattern which is 
advocated by Cochran and Wartick (1988) and Blair (1995). In fact, corporate 
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governance includes ownership, capital structure, ownership structure, and managerial 
control and so on. The senior executives of the company affect the corporate 
investment decisions directly since they are a key part of corporate governance 
structure and the excellent top management guarantees the human resources of the 
enterprise. How to effectively motivate the company's top executives to work harder 
and further improve the management and corporate performance has become a major 
issue for the development of enterprises. The function of independent directors is to 
supervise, restrict and evaluate, improve the corporate governance structure and 
reduce the control of insiders.  
 
For the state-owned listed companies in China, the controlling shareholders are 
state-owned enterprises and the state act as the owner does not have enough 
supervision on the managers chosen by it. Therefore, the introduction of independent 
directors is quite necessary.  
 
The higher the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the greater the influence 
of major shareholders on investment decisions is. A series of researches focus on the 
agency problems found that large shareholders would damage the interests of 
minority shareholders, especially when the listed companies have residual earnings, 
these major shareholders usually decide not to pay dividends for their own interests 
and for the purpose of expanding the scale of listed companies and then this portion of 
funds are used by managers for new investments. Zhu, Zhao and Bao (2016) state that 
high shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders and high degree of separation of 
control rights and cash flow rights will promote the positive impact of investor 
sentiment on over-investment. Chen, Sung and Yang (2017) argue that the 
concentration of ownership is negatively correlated with the corporate investment 
efficiency and this effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises than in 
private enterprises. The research results of Lai and Liu (2017) show that better 
features of top management team can mitigate the distortions caused by 
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over-investment in the enterprises. The company's corporate governance can be 
measured by the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the check-and-balance 
ownership and the number of independent directors of the company. Therefore, these 
findings mentioned above lead to the second hypothesis of this paper. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder is positively 
correlated with the over-investment in Chinese SOEs; check-and-balance ownership 
and the number of independent directors of Chinese SOEs are negatively related to 
the over-investment in Chinese SOEs. 
2.3 Free cash flow and over-investment 
The level of cash holdings is quite relevant since it is related to whether the internal 
capital can meet the investment needs of enterprises and whether the enterprises need 
external financing. Therefore, it has a certain impact on the financing costs of 
enterprises. There is no doubt that the corporate decisions on the cash holdings are 
crucial to the development of the company.  
 
It is believed that managers have strong motivation to improve their personal 
performance, with this in mind, many of them will invest the free cash flow of 
enterprises in with negative net present value in order to expand the scale of business 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder & Poterba, 1988). Stulz (1990) and Strong and 
Meyer (1990) all found that the correlation between corporate investment and its cash 
flow is very high. Harford (1999) studied whether the excess capital of enterprises 
produced effective mergers and acquisitions policies and pointed out that companies 
that hold surplus capitals are more likely to engage in M&A activities, however, the 
scientific nature of their M&A behavior is not high. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
mergers and acquisitions will not be high since they may damage the interests of 
stakeholders.  
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Vogt (1994) employed the intersection of cash flow in the Vogt model and investment 
opportunities and showed that the correlation between corporate investment and cash 
flow is the major reason lead to the over-investment of enterprises. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) explored the status of excess cash flow of enterprises from the perspective 
of management, they believed that many managers become overconfident when they 
identify the company has excess capitals and these managers will blindly invest with 
these capitals in order to expand the firm size, which eventually lead to the 
over-investment. Richardson (2006) examined the relationship between free cash flow 
and over-investment empirically and explained the positive correlation between cash 
flow and over-investment in different ways. According to Cai (2014), companies 
whose free cash flow is greater than zero are more likely to incur over-investment, 
companies whose free cash flow is less than zero are more likely to incur 
under-investment. In consistent with these findings and arguments mentioned above, 
the third hypothesis of this paper is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The enterprises’ free cash flow is positively related to the 
over-investment in Chinese SOEs.  
2.4 Financing constraints and over-investment 
The senior executives with information advantages have better understandings of the 
company's operations due to the universal existence of information asymmetry. The 
uncertainty of information brings more doubts to these investors and thus raises the 
cost of external financing. The difference between internal financing and external 
financing which is objectively formed makes internal financing become more 
favorable than external financing. Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that the internal 
staff of the company holds the advantage of information and can obtain internal 
financing at a relatively low financing costs based on the internal information, 
therefore the difference of financing costs is formed, it strengthens the constraints on 
the external financing. With this in mind, internal financing is preferred by many 
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companies. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) emphasized that the imperfect competition in 
the competitive market is mainly caused by information asymmetry. As a result, 
higher transaction costs are incurred, which directly increases the external financing 
costs. Therefore, the external financing pressure increased at the same time. Under the 
dual influence of higher transaction costs and the need to obtain more funds for 
investment, the financing constraints imposed on the company are continuously 
expanding. 
 
The study show that the information asymmetry exists objectively and the transaction 
costs should be considered at the same time, which determines that the internal and 
external financing cannot be equal. The costs of internal financing are usually far 
more less than the costs of external financing. Therefore, the dependence of corporate 
investment on its internal funds has increased dramatically due to relatively lower 
internal financing costs, relatively higher external financing costs and limited source 
of funds (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder & Poterba, 1988). The modified 
pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) indicates that corporate managers 
follow a hierarchy to choose their financing sources, the first choice is internal 
financing, the second choice is debt financing and the third choice is equity financing. 
When the enterprises’ free cash flow is insufficient, they may turn to the external debt 
financing, at this time, these managers are faced with the pressure to repay the interest 
and principal periodically, therefore debt can restrain the over-investment behaviors to 
a certain extent.  
 
Hart and Moore (1995) suggested that if these managers choose debt financing, they 
would have to be affected by the regular payments of debt, at the same time, such 
constraints make it impossible for managers to consume on the job or blindly expand 
the firm size. With this in mind, debt financing can effectively suppress the 
over-investment in the enterprises. The analysis of Chava and Roberts (2008) show 
that the financing constraint has the following advantages: the existence of debt will 
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prompt the management to invest the free cash flow in the projects with positive net 
present value; these creditors may indirectly interfere with the company’s investment 
decisions in order to prevent from investing in projects with high risk. At the 
meanwhile, the regular payments make management face a shortage of operational 
liquidity. As a result, multiple aspects of evaluations will be carried out when 
managers are makings investment decision-makings, which helps to control the risk of 
over-investment in the companies. 
 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) analyzed the financing constraints in groups by selecting 
factors such as dividend payout rate, size of the company and the level of commercial 
paper and showed that when the managers of enterprises realize that they are subject 
to the high financing constraint, they will become more active in the accumulation of 
capital. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) studies from the theoretical 
perspective and showed that companies which facing financing constraints often 
usually set relatively high limit on the reserves since they are relatively cautious in 
investing; however, companies which do not subject to the financing constraints 
would not do so. According to Mande, Park and Son (2012), the higher the degree of 
information asymmetry, the greater obstacle for implementing the equity financing is 
and the more apparent the financing constraints on the companies are.  
 
Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2010) collected data on Chinese listed 
companies from year 1998 to year 2005 and pointed out that private companies in 
China are heavily constrained by financing, however, these Chinese state-owned 
enterprises which are closely related to state-owned commercial banks do not subject 
to the financing constraints. According to Huang, Jin and Chen (2016), based on the 
effect of increased capital, higher investors’ sentiments and increased credit financing, 
enterprises have mitigated their financing constraints, and this also facilitated the 
abuse of enterprises’ capitals. Therefore, investor sentiment is positively related to the 
over-investment in companies. The company's financing constraints can be measured 
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by the leverage ratio of the company. The discussion mentioned above leads to the 
fourth hypothesis of this paper. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Financing constraints are negatively related to the over-investment in 
Chinese state-owned listed enterprises. 
2.5 Government intervention and over-investment 
In terms of the relationship between the government and enterprises, in order to 
achieve its political objectives, the government internalize the inefficient goals into 
the investment activities of enterprises by intervening the operational 
decision-makings of enterprises, which lead to the over-investment of these 
intervened enterprises. Frye and Shleifer (1997) suggested that the government’s 
intervention in corporate investment activities has two kinds of effects which include 
the invisible hand and the grabbing hand. The government intervention will inevitably 
transform the target function of the state-owned enterprises into the government's 
preferred function, resulting in the low investment efficiency of SOEs (e.g., Lin, Cai 
& Li, 1998; Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Sun, Tang & Wu, 2011). A series of consistent 
evidences show that the negative impact of government intervention on corporate 
investment efficiency maybe further exacerbated by SOEs’ tight budgets since these 
state-owned enterprises need to receive governments’ support in order to obtain 
financing (e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006; Fan, Rui & Zhao, 2008).  
 
According to Faccio (2006), political relations are a common phenomenon in the 
stock markets around the world. Many researches show that political relations 
enhance the value of companies (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; 
Faccio, Masulis & McConnell, 2006). Chen et al. (2011) argued that the phenomenon 
of government intervention in corporate investment exists in many countries, however, 
among them, the governments’ intervention is relatively significant in China. On the 
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one hand, the Chinese government controls ownership by holding a great number of 
shares in state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, the government directly appoints 
the senior executives of state-owned enterprises; thereby it can increase the control 
over state-owned enterprises. According to Chen et al. (2011), a majority of senior 
executives of Chinese state-owned listed enterprises have the political experience that 
working as a government official. The government intervention on the company can 
be measured by the political relations between the firm and the Chinese government. 
Therefore, based on the findings and discussions shown above, the fifth hypothesis of 
this paper is proposed. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The government relations are positively related to the over-investment 
of Chinese state-owned listed enterprises.  
2.6 The measurement of investment inefficiency  
Jensen (1986) believes that when the net present value of the project is negative, and 
the investment decision makers of the company still invest the free cash flow of the 
company into the project, then they are engaged in the over-investment. Similarly, 
when the company has sufficient cash flow and the net present value of the project is 
positive, the investment decision makers passively or voluntarily give up the 
investment opportunity. Then they are engaged in the under-investment. When 
measuring the efficiency of investment, there are mainly three typical methods of 
measurement in the academic world.  
 
2.6.1 The model of investment-cash flow sensitivities  
According to Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba (1988), when studying 
the financing constraints and corporate investment, the following models is 
established: 
 (𝐼/𝐾)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋/𝐾)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝐶𝐹/𝐾)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where 𝐼𝑖𝑡 stands for the investment in the fixed assets, 𝑋 stands for a vector variable 
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for investment opportunity, 𝐶𝐹 stands for the internal free cash flows of the company, 
all variables are standardized by the capital stock 𝐾 of the enterprise at the beginning 
of the period. 𝑓 stands for the function that depends on the variable for investment 
opportunity, 𝑔 stands for the function that depends on the variable for corporate 
internal free cash flows. The stronger the financing constraints that faced by the 
company, the greater the dependence of corporate investment on its free cash flow, the 
larger the value for coefficient 𝐶𝐹/𝐾, therefore, the relationship between investment 
expenditure and cash flow can become more sensitive (Fazzari et al., 1988). The FHP 
model links the free cash flow with the corporate investment behavior and extends the 
research field of free cash flow. However, this model is not perfect mainly in the 
following aspects: First, it is unable to distinguish whether the sensitivity of the 
relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow is caused by 
over-investment or under-investment. Second, this model only considers one factor 
that affects the sensitivity of investment and cash flow, which is the financing 
constraint of the company, while ignoring the existence of many other potential 
relevant factors such as the size of the company, the characteristics of the industry that 
the company belongs to and the opportunistic behavior of these managers. Third, the 
actual situation in the economic environment may aggravate the measurement 
deviation of the variable investment opportunity X. 
 
2.6.2 The discriminative model of the intersection of cash flow and investment 
opportunity  
 
Vogt (1994) studied the relationship between the cash flow of the company and 
corporate investment and established the model as follow: 
 (𝐼/𝐾)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝐶𝐹/𝐾)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻/𝐾)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆/𝐾)𝑖,𝑡  
 + 𝛽4(𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝐹/𝐾)𝑖,𝑡(𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
where 𝐼 stands for the investment for fixed assets, 𝐶𝐹 stands for the cash flow of 
the enterprise, 𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 stands for the changes in the cash dividends of the enterprise, 
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𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 stands for the sales revenue of the enterprise, 𝑄 means that investment 
opportunities are measured by Tobin’s Q (1969). 𝑢𝑖 stands for the control variable 
for company and 𝜏𝑡 stands for the control variable for year. 𝐾 stands for the fixed 
assets at the beginning of the period. The Vogt model can make up for the defect of 
the FHP model that the FHP model cannot distinguish between over-investment or 
under-investment through the intersection of cash flow and investment opportunity. 
However, this model can only be used to identify whether there exists 
over-investment phenomena or under-investment phenomena in the companies. This 
model does not measure the degree of over-investment or under-investment of the 
sample company. 
 
2.6.3 The investment expectation model 
 
Richardson (2006) uses the accounting data to construct a quantitative analysis 
framework that measures the over-investment and the under-investment of enterprises 
for the first time. Richardson (2006) points out that the total investment of the 
company should be divided into the required investment expenditure to maintain the 
current business and investment expenditures for new projects. Among the new 
investment expenditures, the optimal part of investment is determined by the 
company's financing constraints, growth opportunities, industry and other factors, and 
a part of it is inefficient expenditure, that is, over-investment or under-investment of 
the enterprises (Richardson, 2006). The relevant models are shown as follows: 
 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1 𝑉/𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1  
 +  𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑡−1  
 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀𝑡  (3) 
 𝑉𝐴𝐼𝑃 = (1-α𝑟) BV+ α (1+r) X – αrd  (4) 
 FCF = 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑃 - 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊
∗   (5) 
Among Equations (3) (4) (5), 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊,𝑡 stands for the company's new investment in the 
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year t. 𝑉/𝑃𝑡−1  stands for the expected growth opportunities in the market. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 stands for the asset to liability ratio. 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 stands for the level of 
cash. 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡−1  stands for the number of years after the company become listed. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 stands for the logarithm of the company's total assets. 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡−1 
stands for the stock returns in the year before the investment. BV stands for the book 
value of the company, r is the discount, X stands for the dividends of the company, rd 
stands for the expenditures for research and development activities of the company. α 
= ω/ (1 + r − ω), ω is the fixed continuity parameter that between 0 and 1. 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊
∗  
stands for the optimal new investment. ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 stands for the dummy 
variable for year, ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 stands for the dummy variable for industry. 
The residual 𝜀𝑡  stands for the inefficient investment expenditures. When 𝜀𝑡  is 
greater than 0, then it indicates that the company is experiencing over-investment. 
When  𝜀𝑡  is less than 0, then it means that the company is experiencing 
under-investment. The value of the absolute value of the residuals represents the 
amount of over-investment or under-investment of the company. 
 
The investment expectation model of Richardson (2006) makes up for the shortage of 
the Vogt model, it can measure whether each company is over-invested or 
under-invested and it can come up with a specific value at the same time. With this in 
mind, this model provides a reliable measure for further analysis of the causes of 
over-investment and under-investment of the enterprises. Therefore, this model has 
been used by a great number of scholars in recent years.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Model design and definition of variables 
Based on the discussions and analysis on the investment efficiency model mentioned 
above, as well as the characteristics of the China’s economic development, this paper 
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mainly employs the investment expectation model of Richardson (2006) and uses a 
multiple linear regression to analyze the influencing factors of inefficiency of Chinese 
state-owned listed enterprises’ capital allocation.  
 
3.1.1 The investment expectation model 
First, the investment expectation model of Richardson (2006) is used to estimate the 
expected level of these Chinese state-owned listed enterprises’ new investment. The 
predicted value of the regression model is the expected level of new investment and 
the residual value is the estimate of over-investment or under-investment of these 
Chinese SOEs. In line with the previous research, we employ the model of 
Richardson (2006) to measure the over-investment in the Chinese SOEs. The model 
(6) used by this paper in the first step is shown as follows: 
 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1 𝑉/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  
 +  𝛽4 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1  
 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (6) 
where 
The dependent variable, 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡 , is the amount of company’s new investment 
expenditures in the current year. It is calculated as the difference between the 
company’s total investment expenditures and its investment expenditures for the 
maintenance of the assets; 
𝑉/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the growth opportunity of the company. It is calculated as the ratio of 
Total assets at the beginning of the year and the sum of company's market value and 
its total debt at the beginning of the year; 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is debt-to-equity ratio of the company in the previous year. It is 
calculated as the ratio of company’s total liabilities to total assets at the beginning of 
the year; 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1  is the cash holdings of the company. It is calculated as the ratio of 
monetary fund holdings to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the number of years the company has been listed on the Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange; 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the logarithm of the total assets at the beginning of the year; 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 is the earnings per share for the year before the investment year; 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 is the company’s new investment expenditures in the previous year; 
∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 and ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 are dummy variables for controlling 
the annual and industry fixed effects, respectively Year equals to 1 for the current year, 
otherwise 0. According to the three-industry classification method proposed by the 
British economist and statistician Clark (1940) based on the work of New Zealand 
economist Fisher (1935), this sample mainly includes secondary and tertiary industry. 
Industry equals to 1 when the company belongs to secondary industry, otherwise 0; 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 refers to the deviations from the expected investment. The positive value of 
residuals is the amount of over-investment in the company.  
The variable 𝑉/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑖,𝑡−1 are the main variables to examine. The variable 
Year and Industry are acting as the control variables. 
 
3.1.2 Empirical model 
Following the research design of Richardson (2006), Xin, Lin & Wang (2007), Bai & 
Lian (2013) and Ding, Knight & Zhang (2016), the following model (7) is established 
to examine the impact of different factors on the Chinese SOEs’ over-investment.  
 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  
 +  𝛽4 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐼𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  
+ 𝛽8 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  
 + 𝛽12 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (7) 
where 
The dependent variable, 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡, is the company’s over-investment in the current 
year. It is the positive residuals of the first model; 
𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 is the free cash flow of the corresponding company in the last year. It is 
calculated as the ratio of company’s operating cash flow to its total assets at the 
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beginning of the year; 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is debt-to-equity ratio of the company in the previous year. It is 
calculated as the ratio of company’s total liabilities to total assets at the beginning of 
the year; 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to the company’s executive compensation. It is calculated as the ratio 
of the top three executives' compensation to the sum of the executive compensation of 
all directors, supervisors and other executives; 
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1  refers to the ownership concentration of the company, which is the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of the Chinese state-owned. It is 
measured as the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of the Chinese 
state-owned enterprises; 
𝐸𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to the check-and-balance ownership of the company. It is calculated as 
the ratio of the sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to the tenth largest 
shareholders of the corresponding company to the shareholding ratio of the largest 
shareholders;  
𝐼𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 is the number of independent directors in the company, which is measured as 
the proportion of independent directors in the total number of board of directors; 
𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 refers to the government intervention which represented by the 
company’s political relationship with Chinese government. Gov_relation is equal to 1 
if the top management has a working experience in the government sectors, otherwise 
0; 
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is the administration costs of the company and it is calculated as the ratio of 
management costs to the total revenue of the company. The definitions of remaining 
variables are the same as before. 
The variable 𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐼𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  and 
𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are the main variables to examine. The control variable includes 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, Year and Industry. 
The significant negative relationship between variable 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
suggests that the Hypothesis 1 is accepted. The significant negative relationship 
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between variable 𝐼𝑑𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝐸𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡  indicates that the relevant 
statements in the Hypothesis 2 is not rejected. The significant positive relationship 
between variable 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 suggests that the relevant statement in the 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted. When there exists a significant positive relationship 
between variable 𝐹𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡, we accept the Hypothesis 3. When there 
exists a significant positive relationship between variable 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  and 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡, we reject the Hypothesis 4. The significant positive relationship between 
variable 𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡  indicates that the Hypothesis 5 is not 
rejected.  
3.2 Sample selection and data source 
The sample of this paper selects companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the period from 2007 to 2016 as a sample. At 
present, there are two major stock exchanges within the mainland of China, including 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange established in November 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange established in December 1990. There are two kinds of shares traded in 
China, that is, A- and B- shares. A-shares are shares which are issued by the Chinese 
enterprises in the mainland and are only allowed to be traded by domestic investors. 
As a result, they are not available for foreign investors to trade. We collect the data 
which determine the nature of corporate ownership from the annual reports of the 
corresponding companies. The state-controlled company refers to the company whose 
large shareholders are state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government of 
China and the government organizations in the provinces, cities and counties. It 
should be noted that for those companies, the shareholding ratio of state-owned 
enterprises is greater than 50 percent. 
Moreover, we manually collected the relevant background information of the senior 
managers of these companies from their annual reports. If a company’s chairman of 
board of directors or chief executive officer has an experience of working in the 
Chinese government department, then this company is regarded as the company 
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which has a political relationship with the Chinese government. The relevant data are 
mainly collected from CSMAR Databases, as well as the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
As a result, we have obtained a total of 1,106 annual observations for 120 A-share 
companies in China's state-controlled listed companies from the CSMAR database 
from 2007 to 2016. The information is disclosed by the annual reports from the two 
major stock exchanges and these observations constitute a preliminary sample for this 
research. The preliminary sample is screened based on the criteria proposed by Chen, 
Sun, Tang & Wu (2011) and Bai & Lian (2013) shown as follows: (1) Companies in 
the financial industry are excluded. This is due to the fact that the balance sheet 
structure and the investment expenditures of the financial companies are quite 
different from those of the general companies due to the special nature of their 
applicable accounting standards. (2) Companies with missing financial data or 
incomplete indicators are excluded. Since the incomplete data or indicators will result 
in the incomplete data collection, which is not conducive to the entire research. (3) 
Companies with negative value of new investment expenditures are excluded. (4) 
Companies whose listed years do not cover the observation period are excluded. This 
is because some of the variables are required to have financial data and information 
for relevant indicators in the previous year to ensure the integrity of the sample data. 
After the screening, the final sample of this paper includes a total of 830 observations 
for 83 companies during the period from 2007 to 2016.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Regression results for inefficient investment of Chinese SOEs 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in the first step 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of major variables  
Variable No. of 
Obs 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variance 
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inewt 830 19.9553 20.0624 1.9075 13.4417 26.4624 3.6385 
VP 830 0.5892 0.5735 0.2814 0.1001 2.1317 0.0792 
LEV 830 0.4995 0.5154 0.2077 0.0394 0.9876 0.0431 
Cash 830 0.1703 0.1315 0.1278 0.0070 0.9999 0.0163 
Age 830 12.6651 13.0000 5.0413 0.0000 24.0000 25.4148 
Size 830 22.7341 22.6850 1.5186 1.9900 27.3200 2.3060 
Ret 830 0.4800 0.3000 1.0673 -1.9600 13.2500 1.1392 
inewt1 830 19.8709 19.9730 1.8834 13.2988 24.9590 3.5472 
Note: The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value and variance are 
reported. The variable inewt represents the new investment expenditures for the current year. The 
variable size represents the size of the company. The variable age represents the number of years 
that the company has been listed. At the same time, the variable Cash represents the holdings of 
the monetary fund of the company. The variable LEV represents the (leverage ratio) debt-to-equity 
ratio of the company in the last year. The variable VP represents the growth opportunity of the 
company. The variable Ret represents the profitability of the company. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the first stage of 
this study. The relatively high mean value of new investment expenditures in the 
current year indicates that the investment level of Chinese state-controlled listed 
companies is relatively higher than other companies and the variable inewt has larger 
variation than others. The large difference between the maximum value and the 
minimum value of inewt shows that there are great discrepancies in new investment 
expenditures between different Chinese SOEs. The relatively high value of standard 
deviation suggests that it is more volatile than others.  
From these results, it can be seen that firm size has the highest mean value among all 
variables.  This indicates that the scale of the company has experienced largest 
variation among all, that is to say, there exists great differences in the firm size. 
Indeed, among the state-controlled companies, there are giant companies that control 
the potential developments of the national economy, as well as high-tech 
research-based small businesses.  
The average number of listing year in the sample is 12.67 years, indicating that the 
selected Chinese state-controlled listed enterprises are all relatively mature. 
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According to the results, this variable has the lowest mean value among all variables, 
which means that the corporate cash holdings has the lowest variation, that is, the 
companies in the sample have relatively stable cash holdings during the observing 
years.  
The average value of this variable is approximately 50 percent, this means that the 
debt ratio of the company is at a relatively high level and most of these companies are 
exposed to greater risk than others. 
With an average value which is greater than 50 percent, it suggests that these Chinese 
state-controlled listed enterprises have greater growth potentials than other enterprises. 
Also, the relatively low standard deviation indicates that these Chinese SOEs have 
relatively stable growth opportunities during the observing years. The lower the value 
of VP represents the company have greater growth opportunities. 
There is a big gap between the maximum value and the minimum value of the 
enterprises’ stock returns, which shows that there are great differences in the 
profitability of state-controlled listed companies and usually manifested in the uneven 
level of their earnings. 
 
4.1.2 Correlation matrix for variables in the first step 
Table 2. Correlation matrix of major variables  
Note: This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of major variables in model (6). 
 V/P LEV Cash Age Size Ret inewt1 
V/P 1       
LEV 0.3645 1      
Cash -0.2197 -0.2983 1     
Age 0.1011 0.0199 0.0077 1    
Size 0.4973 0.2874 -0.0987 0.1746 1   
Ret -0.1891 -0.2242 0.3219 -0.0305 0.1646 1  
inewt1 0.3629 0.1218 -0.1105 0.0742 0.6645 0.1779 1 
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According to the results of Pearson correlation table, these variables can well explain 
the changes of dependent variable since the cross-correlation between each pair of 
variables are not very strong. Therefore, each variable will affect the dependent 
variable inewt separately. In short, the results shown above indicate that this model 
does not have serious multicollinearity. 
 
4.1.3 Regression results in the first step 
According to Hausman (1978), the Hausman test (which also called the Hausman 
specification test) is a useful tool to differentiate between the fixed effect regression 
model and the random effect regression model when analyzing the panel data. In the 
null hypothesis (H0 ) of Hausman test, the random effect (RE) regression model is 
more preferred than the fixed effect (FE) regression model (Hausman, 1978). When 
the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effect regression model is preferred 
(Hausman, 1978). 
Table 3. Hausman tests for model (6) 
Null hypothesis: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
Chi-square (7)        123.86*** 
Note: The null hypothesis of the Hausman test suggests random-effects regression model is better 
than fixed-effects regression model. The test statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with degree 
of free equal to 7. *** denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
According to the results of the Hausman test, the H0 is rejected at the 5% level, then 
fixed effect (FE) regression is considered to be better than random effect (RE) 
regression and a fixed-effects regression model should be used here.  
Table 4. Major regression results for model (6) 
Fixed-effects (within) regression 
Variables inewt 
Intercept 6.5908*** 
 
(6.24) 
VP -0.8683*** 
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(-4.61) 
LEV -0.3593 
 
(-1.18) 
Cash 1.7948*** 
 
(3.93) 
Age 0.0678*** 
 
(4.52) 
Size 0.1343*** 
 
(2.82) 
Ret 0.0965* 
 
(1.72) 
inewt1 0.4927*** 
 
(14.42) 
Year Yes 
Industry Yes 
Adj-R2 58.50% 
N 830 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The major regression results of inefficient investment in Chinese 
SOEs are reported. 
The p-value is 0.000, which is less than 0.05, indicating that the relationship between 
inewt and VP is statistically significant. According to the regression results shown in 
the above table, the negative coefficient between variable inewt and VP suggests that 
there is a negative relation between company’s new investment expenditures in the 
current year and its VP. That is to say, when the company’s VP decreases, the growth 
opportunities of state-controlled listed enterprises increase, the corresponding new 
investment expenditures of these enterprises for that year will also increase. Therefore, 
the better the growth of the company in the previous period, the better the company's 
expectations for the future development and the higher the level of investment will be.  
At the meanwhile, since the p-value is greater than 0.05, then it means that the 
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relationship between inewt and LEV is not statistically significant. The negative 
coefficient between variable inewt and LEV indicates that there exists a negative 
relationship between company’s new investment expenditures in the current year and 
its debt-to-equity ratio. When the leverage ratio of these Chinese SOEs increases, the 
corresponding new investment expenditures of these companies in the same year will 
decrease proportionately. Therefore, the higher the company's leverage ratio at the 
beginning of the year, the greater the pressures on the company's own funds. These 
pressures are mainly reflected in the level of the company's investment and are 
usually manifested by the reduction in the new investment expenditures. To a certain 
extent, it also shows that state-owned holding enterprises are less constrained by the 
debt since these enterprises possess relatively abundant resources and own relatively 
convenient financing channels. 
Meanwhile, the p-value is 0.000, which is less than 0.05, indicating that the 
relationship between inewt and Cash is statistically significant. Moreover, the positive 
coefficient between variable inewt and Cash indicates that there exists a positive 
relation between company’s new investment expenditures in the current year and its 
cash holdings. When the cash holding rate of these Chinese state-holding enterprises 
increases, the corresponding new investment expenditures of these companies in the 
current year will also increase. Therefore, when these companies have relatively 
sufficient free cash flows, the desire of the company's senior managers to make new 
investments will become stronger and they are more likely to achieve these new 
investments.  
The p-value is 0.000, which is less than 0.05, indicating that the relationship between 
inewt and Age is statistically significant. The positive coefficient between variable 
inewt and Age shows that there is a positive relationship between the new investment 
expenditures of the company and its age. When the number of listing year of these 
Chinese state-controlled listed enterprises increases, the corresponding new 
investment expenditures of these companies in that year will also increase. Therefore, 
mature listed companies are more likely to maintain good and stable investment. 
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According to the results shown above, the p-value is 0.005, indicating that the 
relationship between inewt and size is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
positive coefficient between variable inewt and size suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between the new investment spending of the company and its scale of 
assets. When the assets scale of state-owned holding companies increases, the 
corresponding new investment expenditures of these companies will also increase 
proportionately. It is generally agreed that when the size of the company becomes 
larger, its capacity to cover risk will become stronger and finally its probability of 
bankruptcy will be reduced. Therefore, the senior executives of these Chinese 
state-controlled companies will continue to increase new investment while pursuing 
the expansion of the company's scale.  
The p-value is 0.085, suggesting that the relationship between inewt and Ret is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, the positive coefficient between 
variable inewt and Ret suggests that there exists a positive relationship between the 
new investment expenditures of the enterprise and its stock returns. Thus, when the 
stock returns of these Chinese state-owned holding companies increase, the 
corresponding new investment expenditure of these companies will also increase. 
Therefore, the higher the stock returns of the company in the previous period, the 
better the company's profitability. Indeed, good profitability enables enterprises to 
possess better abilities to repay their debts, distribute the dividends, raise capitals and 
expand the investments and provides greater possibilities for companies to achieve the 
reinvestment in the near future. 
The p-value is 0.000, indicating that the relationship between inewt and inewt1 is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The positive coefficient between variable 
inewt and inewt1 indicates that the company’s new investment expenditures in the last 
year is positively related to those in the current year. Therefore, if the new investment 
expenditures of these Chinese SOEs in the previous year increased, then the 
expenditures on new investments tend to increase significantly in the current year.  
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4.2 Regression results for over-investment of Chinese SOEs 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in the second step 
Table 5. Number of over-investment and under-investment 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 total 
Overin 44 45 41 35 43 45 45 46 43 45 432 
Underin 39 38 42 48 40 38 38 37 40 38 398 
Notes: Overin denotes SOEs with over-investment while Underin denotes SOEs with 
under-investment.  
 
Figure 1. No. of over-investment and under-investment for 10 years 
 
According to the statistical results of the capital allocation efficiency of sample 
companies, there are 432 Chinese SOEs conducting the over-investment, which 
accounts for 52.05 percent of the sample. Moreover, during the period from 2007 to 
2016, the number of companies with over-investment exceeds that with 
under-investment in eight out of ten years. It indicates that the problem of 
over-investment is quite common in these companies. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of major variables for model (7) 
Variable No. of Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Variance 
Overin 432 0.9880 0.9036 0.6311 0.0357 3.3769 0.3982 
fcf 432 0.0944 0.0388 0.3215 -0.4167 4.1903 0.1034 
lev 432 0.5329 0.5590 0.1924 0.0394 0.9608 0.0370 
pay 432 0.4033 0.3895 0.1185 0.0044 0.7918 0.0140 
top 432 0.5589 0.5582 0.1326 0.2509 0.8411 0.0176 
er 432 0.2355 0.1545 0.2332 0.0081 1.0270 0.0544 
idr 432 0.3039 0.3000 0.0454 0.1111 0.4706 0.0021 
Gov_relation 432 0.2662 0.0000 0.4425 0.0000 1.0000 0.1958 
adm 432 0.0611 0.0451 0.0466 0.0041 0.2699 0.0022 
Cash 432 0.1437 0.1202 0.1031 0.0070 0.6694 0.0106 
Age 432 11.7454 12.0000 4.7572 0.0000 23.0000 22.6311 
Size 432 23.2453 23.2950 1.2432 19.9900 26.9600 1.5456 
Ret 432 0.4201 0.3295 0.5243 -1.7400 2.7020 0.2748 
Industry 432 0.7037 1.0000 0.4572 0.0000 1.0000 0.2090 
Notes: The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum value, maximum value and variance are 
reported. The variable Overin represents the amount of company’s over-investment in the current 
year. The variable fcf represents the free cash flow of the corresponding company in the last year. 
The variable lev represents the leverage ratio (debt-to-equity ratio) of the company. The variable 
pay represents the executive compensation, which is the ratio of the top three executives' 
compensation to the sum of the executive compensation of all directors, supervisors and other 
executives. The variable top represents the ownership concentration of the company, which is the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of the Chinese state-owned enterprises. The variable 
er represents the check-and-balance ownership of the company. To be specific, it is the ratio of the 
sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to the tenth largest shareholders of the corresponding 
company to the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders. The variable idr represents the 
number of independent directors in the company, that is, the proportion of independent directors in 
the total number of board of directors. The variable Gov_relation represents company’s political 
relationship with Chinese government. The variable adm represents the administration costs of the 
company, which reflects the governance costs of the company. 
 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the second stage of 
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this study. According to the results shown above for descriptive statistics, there are 
432 observations relating to the over-investment. The relatively large difference 
between the maximum and minimum values of Overin indicates that the degree of 
over-investment in the different Chinese state-owned listed enterprises is also quite 
different.  
The large gap between the maximum and minimum values of the company’s free cash 
flow indicates that there exist significant differences in the available cash flows of 
different Chinese state-owned listed companies. Some Chinese state-controlled listed 
companies have quite sufficient free cash flow and it serves as the capital foundation 
for them to engage in the over-investment; however, at the same time, some 
companies may even associate with negative free cash flow. The average value of this 
variable is greater than 50 percent, which shows that the companies involved in the 
over-investment have relatively higher debt ratios than others.  
According to the results shown above, there are large differences in the executive pay 
of the top management, therefore, the degree of motivation to make investments can 
be differ among these top managers in the Chinese SOEs. It can be seen that the 
average value of this variable is greater than 50 percent, which suggests that 
companies involved in the over-investment are usually companies with high 
ownership concentration, where large shareholders monopoly the ownership of the 
company and have greater influence on the company’s investment decision-makings.  
The average value of this variable is around 24 percent, which suggests that the 
mechanism of check-and-balance is not working well. The difference on this variable 
between different companies is large and the proportion is not so high at the same 
time. It also shows that the phenomenon of the absolute holding by large shareholders 
is relatively common and prominent in these China's state-controlled listed 
companies. 
The proportion located in the range of 11 percent to 47 percent and the average value 
is around 30 percent, indicating that the setting on the independent directors is 
relatively reasonable. Gov_relation is equal to 1 if the top management has a working 
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experience in the government sectors, otherwise 0. In terms of the input of Chinese 
state-controlled listed companies on the governance costs, it can be seen that the 
overall level is not high.  
 
4.2.2 Correlation matrix for variables in the second step 
Table 7. Correlation matrix of major variables in model (7) 
Note: This table reports the Pearson correlation matrix of major variables in model (6). 
According to the results of Pearson correlation table, these variables can well explain 
the changes of dependent variable since the cross-correlation between each pair of 
variables is not very strong. Therefore, each variable will affect the dependent 
variable Overin separately. To sum up, the results shown above indicate that this 
model does not have serious multicollinearity. 
 
4.2.3 Regression results in the second step 
Table 8. Results of Hausman tests for model (7) 
Null hypothesis: difference in coefficients is not systematic 
Chi-square (12)    9.70 
Note: The null hypothesis of the Hausman test means random-effects regression model is better 
than fixed-effects regression model. The test statistics under the null follows a Chi-square 
distribution with degree of freedom equal to 12.  
According to the results of the Hausman test, the null hypothesis is not rejected at any 
 fcf lev pay top er idr Gov_relation 
fcf 1       
lev -0.0442 1      
pay -0.0667 -0.1061 1     
top 0.1232 -0.0413 0.1095 1    
er -0.0336 0.0738 -0.0633 -0.6228 1   
idr 0.0016 0.0344 -0.0142 0.1473 -0.1305 1  
Gov_relation -0.0737 0.0113 0.0755 0.1001 -0.1228 0.0730 1 
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conventional level. Then random effect (RE) regression model is considered to be 
better than fixed effect (FE) regression model and a random-effect GLS estimation 
should be used here.  
Table 9. Major regression results for model (7) 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Variables Overin 
Intercept -3.1708*** 
 
(-3.46) 
fcf 0.0919** 
 
(0.97) 
lev -0.0848 
 
(-0.42) 
pay 0.0691 
 
(0.24) 
top 0.1842* 
 
(0.53) 
er 0.4885*** 
 
(2.89) 
idr 1.7704** 
 
(2.29) 
Gov_relation 0.1000** 
 
(1.00) 
adm 0.5168 
 
(0.61) 
Cash -0.0788 
 
(-0.22) 
Age -0.0227*** 
 
(-2.71) 
Size 0.1569*** 
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(3.80) 
Ret 0.0654 
 
(1.00) 
Year Yes 
Industry Yes 
Adj-R2 16.78% 
N 432 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively. t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The major regression results of over-investment in Chinese SOEs are 
reported. 
The p-value is 0.808, which is greater than 0.1, it indicates that the relationship 
between company’s executive compensation and the over-investment in the company 
is not statistically significant at the 10%, 5% or even 1% level. The positive 
coefficient between Overin and pay indicates that the executive compensation system 
does not form a constraint on the over-investment in the company. Therefore, the 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected. It is generally agreed that implement the necessary 
incentives for top executives of the company and properly increase their remuneration 
are conducive to the further development of the company since this corporate policy 
encourages these managers to enhance their sense of responsibilities. However, in 
China, these top executives of state-controlled listed companies are merely agents of 
the government. Due to the lack of reasonable property rights relations, it can easily 
lead to the distortions in these top managers’ value target. At the same time, the 
imperfect corresponding assessment and supervision mechanisms make them prone to 
blindly pursue the expansion of the company's scale at the expense of potential future 
gains and invest state-owned assets in new projects with negative net present values 
so that achieve the improvement in their personal performance, which eventually lead 
to the over-investment in the company. 
Furthermore, the p-value is 0.022, which is less than 0.05, suggesting that the 
relationship between variable Overin and idr is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The positive coefficient between variable Overin and idr indicates that there exists a 
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positive relationship between the company’s over-investment and the number of its 
independent directors. Therefore, the statement relevant to the number of independent 
directors in the Hypothesis 2 is rejected. As a matter of fact, the major purposes of the 
mechanism of independent directors is to enable independent directors to play an 
important role in improving the operating quality of listed companies, enhancing the 
decision-making ability of the board of directors and protecting the interests of 
investors, thereby effectively restrain the company's excessive investment. Therefore, 
based on the results shown above, it also shows that this mechanism is still in its 
initial stage since it lacks systematic and comprehensive supervision and it has not 
really played its due role in these Chinese SOEs. 
At the same time, the p-value is 0.059, indicating that the relationship between Overin 
and top is statistically significant at the 10% level. Also, the positive coefficient 
between variable Overin and top suggests that the ownership concentration of the 
company is positively correlated with the over-investment and the relationship 
between these two is quite close. Therefore, the statement relevant to the shareholding 
ratio of the largest shareholder in the Hypothesis 2 is accepted. In terms of the 
variables which represent the ownership structure of the company, using the 
shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder to measure the degree of ownership 
concentration of China's state-controlled listed companies is mainly based on the 
consideration of the special institutional background of these companies. The higher 
the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, the stronger their control over major 
corporate decision-makings is. It shows that the relatively high ownership 
concentration is the major factors that lead to the over-investment of these Chinese 
SOEs. Since the largest shareholder of Chinese state-controlled listed companies are 
the agent of the government, pursuing high-speed growth has often become their 
goals, and consequently the over-investment in these Chinese SOEs can easily occur. 
The results are in line with the viewpoints of Zhu, Zhao & Bao (2016) and Chen, 
Sung & Yang (2017). 
At the meanwhile, the p-value is 0.004, which is less than 0.01, indicating that the 
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relationship between Overin and er is statistically significant at the 1% confidence 
level. Moreover, the positive coefficient between variable Overin and er indicates that 
the company’s check-and-balance ownership is positively related to the 
over-investment in the company. Therefore, the statement relevant to the 
check-and-balance ownership in the Hypothesis 2 is rejected. This indicates that the 
ownership structure of the company is not reasonable and the mechanism of checks 
and balances has not yet been truly established in these Chinese SOEs since a 
minority of shareholders still monopolizes the ownership of the company.  
At the same time, the p-value is 0.033, which is less than 0.05, suggesting that the 
relationship between Overin and fcf is statistically significant at the 5% confidence 
level. According to the regression results shown above, the positive coefficient 
between variable Overin and fcf indicates that there exists a positive relationship 
between company’s over-investment and its free cash flows. That is to say, when the 
free cash flow of these Chinese state-controlled listed companies increases, the 
corresponding mount of over-investment in the current year will also increase. 
Therefore, the Hypothesis 3 is accepted. The more sufficient the free cash flow in the 
companies, the more available the funds which can be used by senior executives of 
the company are. Based on the solid foundation of capital, these companies are prone 
to engage in the over-investment. This also directly shows that free cash flow is the 
main factor leading to over-investment in Chinese SOEs, which is consistent with the 
viewpoints of Jensen (1986), Vogt (1994), Malmendier & Tate (2005) and Richardson 
(2006).  
Meanwhile, the p-value is 0.677, suggesting that the relationship between Overin and 
lev is not statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. Therefore, the 
Hypothesis 4 is rejected. The level of debt does not have a constraint effect on the 
contingent governance of these Chinese state-owned listed enterprises. In China, the 
Chinese government and commercial banks impose double soft budget constraints, 
which make it more convenient for state-controlled listed companies to obtain 
financing channels and subject to relatively lower debt constraints. With this in mind, 
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the overall capital structure of the company is not a major factor which leads to the 
over-investment of the company. The results are in line with the findings of Poncet, 
Steingress & Vandenbussche (2010). 
At the same time, the p-value is 0.032, suggesting that the relationship between 
Overin and Gov_relation is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. The 
positive coefficient between Overin and Gov_relation indicates that the company’s 
political relationship is positively correlated with the over-investment in the company. 
The stronger the company’s political relations, the higher degree of over-investment it 
may involve in. Therefore, the Hypothesis 5 is accepted. In the sample of this paper, if 
the company’s chairman of board of directors or chief executive officer has an 
experience of working in the Chinese government department, the corresponding 
company is considered to have a political relationship with the government. Among 
the 830 sample observations, there are 580 sample observations are determined to 
have political relations with the Chinese government, which accounts for 69.88% of 
the total. When there is a political relationship between the company and the 
government, the government will often appoint people who have government working 
experience to serve as senior managers of these state-controlled listed companies, 
thereby affecting the operations and decision makings of these companies through the 
people who are chosen by the government. In this way, the Chinese government 
combines its working goals with the company’s development goals through their 
intervention and this can lead to the over-investment in Chinese SOEs. It shows that 
the government intervention is the main factor that leading to the over-investment 
problem in Chinese SOEs, which is in line with the findings of Chen et al. (2011).  
4.2.4 Robustness checks 
In order to examine the robustness of the empirical results, the following sensitivity 
test is conducted in this paper. Since the investment expectation model of Richardson 
(2006) ignores the circumstance where companies are engaging in the modest 
investment, we assume that there is no pure overinvestment in the company, following 
Xin, Lin & Wang (2007) and Bai & Lian (2013). According to Xin, Lin & Wang 
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(2007) and Bai & Lian (2013), the 20% of the total amount of residuals that are 
greater than 0 are regarded as a reasonable investment part. The Chinese 
state-controlled listed enterprises which have positive residuals based on the 
regression results of the first model are still used to constitute the initial sample. The 
sample observations are ranked by their residual values. And 20% of the total 
observations within the initial sample whose residuals are close to the zero are 
removed to avoid the potential influence of the company’s modest investment on the 
results. Therefore, the remaining 346 sample observations form a new final sample for 
conducting the empirical analysis. The results are shown as follows. 
Table 10. Regression results for robustness check 
Random-effects GLS regression 
Variables Overin 
Intercept -0.6698 
 
(-0.68) 
fcf 0.1018** 
 
(1.19) 
lev -0.0637 
 
(-0.30) 
pay 0.2009 
 
(0.71) 
top 0.0251* 
 
(0.07) 
er 0.4188** 
 
(2.52) 
idr 2.2555*** 
 
(2.76) 
Gov_relation 0.1996* 
 
(1.79) 
adm 0.3871 
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(0.41) 
Cash -0.3306 
 
(-0.88) 
Age -0.0149* 
 
(-1.66) 
Size 0.0503 
 
(1.13) 
Ret 0.0198 
 
(0.31) 
Year Yes 
Industry Yes 
Adj-R2 0.11 
N 346 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of significance, respectively. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The regression results for robustness check are reported. 
According to the regression results of robustness check shown above, the 
relationships between fcf, er, idr and Overin are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
At the same time, the relationships of  top and Gov_relation with overinvestment are 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Therefore, in terms of the significance of the 
relationships, the results are consistent with the main regression results for Equation 
(7). Also, pay, fcf, er, idr, top and Gov_relation are positively related to the Overin, 
while lev is negatively related to the Overin. This is also in line with the major results 
for equation (7). Overall, the regression results are robust based on the above analysis.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper set out to develop detailed discussion and analysis on the factors affecting 
the over-investment of these Chinese SOEs from the perspective of free cash flow, 
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ownership structure, agency costs, financing constraints and government intervention 
based on the sample of the Chinese state-owned listed companies during the period of 
year 2007 to year 2016. It is generally agreed that the efficiency of corporate 
investment play an important role in the heathy development of the company in the 
long-run. However, in the recent years, there are more and more Chinese state-owned 
listed enterprises engaged in the over-investment and it has gradually become a 
common phenomenon in China. Therefore, in order to seek a theoretical basis for 
standardizing the corporate governance and improving the efficiency of investment, 
this paper focuses on the over-investment in Chinese SOEs and presents relevant 
evidence on the factors affecting over-investment behaviors in these enterprises.  
The empirical results of this paper reveal several key findings. First, the phenomenon 
of over-investment is relatively obvious among the Chinese state-controlled listed 
enterprises. According to the statistical results on the efficiency of capital allocation 
for 830 sample observations, there are 432 observations relate to the over-investment 
problems, which accounts for the 52.05% of the total. It suggests that a majority of 
Chinese state-controlled listed enterprises have engaged in the over-investment. It also 
shows that most of the Chinese state-owned holding companies have investment 
impulsion and it usually manifested as the company’s over-investment in terms of 
their capital allocation efficiency. Therefore, to a certain extent, it has caused the 
waste of social resources. Second, substantial free cash flow, relatively high 
ownership concentration and government intervention are the main factors that lead to 
the over-investment in China's state-controlled listed companies. At the same time, the 
government intervention also play an important role in causing the over-investment in 
these enterprises since the Chinese government has appointed people with 
government working experience to serve as the top management and lead these 
companies to non-efficiency investment activities. Third, the financing constraints 
play a positive role in restraining the over-investment of Chinese SOEs, but their 
effect is quite weak. The level of debt does not have a constraint effect on the 
contingent governance of these Chinese state-owned listed enterprises. In China, the 
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Chinese government and commercial banks impose double soft budget constraints, 
which make it more convenient for state-controlled listed companies to obtain 
financing channels and subject to relatively lower debt constraints. Fourth, the 
distortions of the senior executives’ value goals lead to the failure of executive 
compensation mechanism and the construction of a proper governance system needs 
to begin with the property rights relations. For a long time, top executives of 
state-controlled listed companies are merely agents of the government and they tend 
to pursue the expansion of the company's scale and invest state-owned assets in 
projects with negative net present value, which eventually result in the 
over-investment. It shows that the system of independent directors and the executive 
compensation have not been well established and improved in China.  
Therefore, based on the findings and analysis mentioned above, a basic conclusion 
can be drawn from this paper. In China, the development vitality of state-controlled 
listed companies has been significantly constrained by its property rights system. With 
this in mind, it is quite necessary for Chinese government to implement the reform of 
the corporate ownership system. In order to achieve the sustainable development of 
these Chinese state-owned enterprises, the following recommendations provide a 
guideline for addressing the identified issues. The Chinese governments need to 
change the excessively concentrated ownership structure of state-owned holding 
companies and try to introduce private capital for cooperation. Moreover, it would be 
better for Chinese government to design a performance evaluation index system 
scientifically and appropriately suppress the power of executives and large 
shareholders of the company. At the same time, the government intervention should 
be weakened. Furthermore, the government should guide these state-owned listed 
enterprises to truly establish a governance system that meet the science of modern 
corporate governance and can foster the improvement of the company’s 
competitiveness and innovation. Fortunately, at present, the Chinese government has 
embarked on the reform of mixed ownership of Chinese state-owned companies. 
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